In this paper we show that when individuals in a bipartite network exclusively choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable. Pair-wise stability implies that no individual breaks her partnership and no two neighbors in the network can form a new partnership while breaking other partnerships if any so that at least one of them improves her payoff and the other one does at least as good. We consider a general class of continuous, strictly convex and strongly monotone preferences over bundles of goods for individuals. Thus, this work extends the general equilibrium framework from markets to networks with exclusive exchanges. We present the complete existence proof using the existence of a generalized stable matching in [7] . The existence proof can be extended to problems in social games as in [3] and [4] .
Introduction
In this paper we show that when individuals in a bipartite network exclusively choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable. Pair-wise stability implies that no individual breaks her partnership and no two neighbors in the network can form a new partnership while breaking other partnerships if any so that at least one of them improves her payoff and the other one does at least as good. We consider a general class of continuous, strictly convex and strongly monotone preferences over bundles of goods for individuals. Thus, this work extends the general equilibrium framework from markets to networks with exclusive exchanges. However, unlike the general equilibrium, the strategy set of individuals is not a continuous demand but is hybrid, since along with demand, the individuals also choose the partners. A simplified version of this problem has been studied in the context of the assignment game [6] where the authors only consider indivisible goods. The existence of a stable set of exchanges is shown through the existence of a feasible solution for the associated relaxed linear program. However, the same methodology cannot be extended to the divisible goods case unless restrictive assumptions are made about the preferences. A similar problem has been studied in [3] . The authors study a similar concept called Matching Equilibrium in Bipartite social games and show its existence by the convergence of the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm [2] . However, even in their case the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm cannot be applied to the case where the set of Nash Equilibria for any pair of individuals is uncountable. We present the complete existence proof using the existence of a generalized stable matching in [7] . The existence proof can be extended to problems in social games as in [3] and [4] .
The organization of the rest of the paper is as such. In section 2, we present the model of bilateral exchanges in networks and characterize the properties of such exchanges. In section 3, we introduce the network exchange game. In section 4 we present the solution concept of pair-wise stability and in section 5 we prove the existence of a pair-wise stable strategy profile in the network exchange game.
Model
In this section we introduce the model of network exchange. We first introduce the network, bilateral exchanges and pareto-efficient exchanges and payoffs and then characterize the sets of exchanges and payoffs. and the relations between them.
Network
A social network is a weighted undirected graph S = (N, E, W ), where N is the set of actors, E is the set of links between actors (E ⊆ N × N ) and W : E → R + is a function over the links and represents the capacity of the link. The set of neighbors of a node i ∈ N is N br (i) = {j ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ E}.
We define M = {X, Y } as the set of types of items of value that can be exchanged between the actors. Each actor i ∈ N has exactly one type of item M i ∈ M . The amount of item M i with actor i is |M i |. Each actor i ∈ N has continuous, strictly convex and strongly monotone preferences i over bundles of items. Alternatively, each actor i has a continuous, strictly quasi-concave and strongly monotone utility function π i : R 2 + → R + . The set of actors can be divided into two disjoint sets based upon the item they have. Let A = {i ∈ N : M i = X} and B = {j ∈ N : M j = Y }. Then an actor in A can only perform a rationally feasible exchange with another actor in B. Thus without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to bipartite social networks in which E ∈ A × B. We will call the actors in A, the buyers and the actors in B, the sellers.
Bilateral Exchanges
An exchange between an actor i and j with (i, j) ∈ E, is a tuple
and involves i giving amount m i units of item M i to actor j and j giving some amount m j units of item M j to actor i.
Each link (i, j) ∈ E is an exchange opportunity of capacity W (i, j) between i and j. The capacity of an exchange opportunity (i, j) is the maximum allowed amount of items that can be exchanged between the actors i and j, i.e.-for any exchange (m i , m j ) between i, and j, m i + m j ≤ W (i, j). The set of possible exchanges EX (i, j) between neighboring actors i, j is a polytope specified by the following inequalities.
The payoff function for actor i in an exchange opportunity (i, j) is V ij : EX (i, j) → R and the payoff function for actor j is V ji : EX (i, j) → R. In an exchange
From the assumptions on π i and π j , the functions V ij and V ji are continuous, strictly quasi-concave and strongly monotone. V ij is increasing in m j and decreasing in m i
and V ji is increasing in m i and decreasing in m j . The set RX (i, j) ⊂ EX (i, j) of rationally feasible exchanges between actors i and j is the convex and compact set specified by the following inequalities.
The convexity comes from the fact that V ij and V ji are strictly quasi-concave and
A payoff vector function V i,j : EX (i, j) → R 2 maps the exchanges to the payoffs of the actors. The payoff vector for exchange (m i , m j ) in the exchange The possible exchange set (EX(i, j)) includes rationally feasible exchange set (RX(i, j)) and the pareto-efficient exchange set (P X(i, j)) includes the rationally feasible pareto-efficient exchange set (RP X(i, j)). The payoff-vector function V i,j maps these exchange sets to the set of payoff-vectors. The possible exchange set EX(i, j) is mapped onto the set of possible payoff vectors XV (i, j). The rationally feasible exchange set RX(i, j) is mapped onto the set of rationally feasible payoff vectors RV (i, j). The pareto-efficient exchange set P X(i, j) is mapped onto the set of pareto-efficient payoff vectors P Q ( i, j)([0, 1]). The rationally feasible pareto-efficient exchange set RP X(i, j) is mapped onto the set of rationally feasible pareto-efficient payoff vectors
continuity of V ij and V ji , V i,j is continuous. Proof. We know that EX (i, j) and RX (i, j) are convex and hence connected.
Since V i,j is continuous, therefore by the intermediate value theorem [1] for connected spaces, the images of EX (i, j) and RX (i, j) under V i,j are connected.
Hence, XV (i, j) and RV (i, j) are connected. Also, since EX (i, j) and RX (i, j)
are compact, their images under the continuous function V i,j are compact. Hence,
From the strong monotonicity property of V ij and V ji ,the maximum payoff for
) and the maximum payoff for j over all exchanges in
We will represent the maximum rationally feasible payoff for i over RX (i, j)
as V * i (RX (i, j)) and the maximum rationally feasible payoff for j over RX (i, j) is V * j (RX (i, j)). The minimum rationally feasible payoff for i over RX (i, j) is V • i (RX (i, j)) and the maximum rationally feasible payoff for j over
From the intermediate value theorem, we know that for any
Pareto-efficient exchanges
The set of pareto-efficient exchanges or pareto-set between two actors i, j is
The set of pareto-efficient payoff vectors is the image of the pareto-set under the payoff-vector function V i,j .
For any
between actors i and j that gives a payoff of at least q i to actor i is characterized by
Clearly, there exists at least one such exchange because
Proposition 2. The characteristics of the pareto-efficient exchanges that satisfy relation 10 for some
, there is a unique pareto-efficient exchange m
Proof. Firstly, we notice that since the payoff functions V ij and V ji are strictly quasi-concave and continuous, therefore for any 
This contradicts the assumption that m
. From the intermediate value theorem, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1), such that
This , j) ) ≤ q i which contradicts the assumption. Therefore by contradiction,
Thus claim 3 holds.
For a pair of neighboring actors (i, j) in the network, we define the functions
where, such that all pareto-efficient payoff vectors are in the range of the path as follows.
The range P Q i,j ([0, 1]) of P Q i,j is the set of all pareto-efficient payoff vectors.
, therefore the set of rationally feasible pareto-efficient payoff vectors is a pathconnected subset of the set of pareto-efficient payoff vectors. Therefore we can create a path RQ i,j : [0, 1] → RV (i, j) such that all rationally feasible paretoefficient payoff vectors are in the range of the path as follows.
is the set of all rationally feasible pareto-efficient payoff vectors. We will refer to the elements of RQ i,j (x) as RQ 
Exchange network
Two exchange opportunities (i, j) and (i, k) are connected to the degree that exchange in one opportunity is contingent on exchange (or nonexchange) in the other opportunity. (a) The connection is positive if exchange in one opportunity is contingent on exchange in the other, (b) The connection is negative if exchange in one opportunity is contingent on nonexchange in the other [5] . In this paper, we restrict our attention to negative connections. Thus each actor can enter into an exchange with at most one of its neighbors.
An exchange network is a graph G = (N, EN ) where EN ⊆ E is the set of exchange opportunities in the social network along which the exchanges happen. We call these active exchange opportunities in the exchange network G. For simplicity, we will refer to EN as the exchange network when N will be understood.
Network Exchange Game
We now introduce the network exchange game. The network exchange game forms the fundamental structure of analysis in our work on exchange networks. In a negatively connected network, the actors pick at most one neighbor to perform an exchange with and also pick the terms of exchange. An exchange happens if two actors sharing an exchange opportunity pick each other and terms of exchange exchange opportunity (i, j), RX (i, j) = φ or RV (i, j) = {0}, then we can remove the exchange opportunity from the network without affecting the payoffs for any outcomes. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume that for each exchange opportunity (i, j) ∈ E, RX (i, j) is non-empty and there is at least one positive rationally feasible payoff vector
For a pure strategy profile p ∈ P , an exchange opportunity (i, j) ∈ E is used for exchange between the actors i and j iff, p i = (j, m i, m j ) and p j = (i, m j , m i ), for
We then say that the exchange opportunity (i, j) ∈ EN is in the exchange network.
For a pure strategy profile p ∈ P , the payoff of the actor i is positive only if ∃j ∈ N br (i), s.t. and p i = (j, m i, m j ) and p j = (i, m j , m i ), for some m i ≤ |M i |,
Thus a strategy profile p induces a unique exchange network EN (p), where
In the cannonical normal form, the game can be represented by the tuple N, P, U , where N is the set of selfish actors, P is the set of pure strategy profiles, and U is the payoff function
The social network provides a constraint on the strategies of the actors and the exchange opportunities provide a constraint on the payoffs derived by the
actors. An actor's pure strategy determines a neighbor she picks to exchange with and the terms of exchange she proposes. If the proposal is mutually agreed upon, a contract or an exchange relationship is formed. In this one shot game, such exchange relationships form an exchange network. The outcome of the game determines both an exchange network and the payoffs for the individuals. In the following theorem and the corollaries, we identify some properties of the payoffs in an exchange network and some constraints on the structure of the exchange network.
For a given exchange network, EN , the set of strategy profiles P (EN ) = {p ∈ P : EN (p) = EN } will be referred to as the supporting strategies for EN .
The set of payoff profiles supported by EN is
We will say that EN supports a payoff profile V.
Solution Concept
The solution concept we explore is of pair-wise stability following [8] . We note that Nash equilibrium is not very informative in the exchange network, since formation of any exchange relationship needs actions by two actors, hence, any change in the action of one player cannot lead to formation of a new link and cannot increase her payoff. Hence, a different notion of equilibrium based upon pair wise stability is needed. The following defines the notion of stability in an exchange network.
A strategy profile is pair-wise stable if, no actor can increase her payoff by changing her strategy (changing the neighbor to propose to or proposing different terms of exchange) and no pair of actors having an exchange opportunity described by the graph S, can jointly change their strategies (to perform an exchange) such that at least one of the actors increases her payoff and the other actor does not decrease her payoff.
Definition 1. Formally, a strategy profile, p, is pair-wise stable if We now provide an equivalent characterization of the pair-wise stable strategy profile that will be used to show the existence of a pair-wise stable strategy profile.
Lemma 1. If a strategy profile p * in the network exchange game is not pair-wise stable then at least one of the conditions holds:
1. there exists and actor i with strategy
2. there exists an exchanges opportunity, (i, j) ∈ E, and rationally feasible pareto-
with at least one strict inequality.
First we note that if an actor i can unilaterally deviate to a strategy p i = (j, m i , m j ) and increase her payoff then p * j = (i, m i , m j ). Therefore, u j (p * ) = 0. Since RV (i, j) has at least one non-zero rationally feasible pareto-efficient payoff vector therefore there exists a rationally feasible pareto-efficient payoff vector (v i , v j ) = RQ i,j (1) such that 
The characterization of pair-wise stable strategy profile in lemma 1 will be used in the next section to prove the existence of a pair-wise stable strategy profile.
Existence of Pair-wise Stable Strategy Profiles and Pairwise Stable Exchange Networks
To show the existence of a pair-wise stable strategy profile, we reduce the problem to a similar problem in [7] . In [7] , we showed the existence of a weighted stable matching. We will show that there is a corresponding pair-wise stable strategy profile. We now state the existence theorem.
Theorem 1. For any network exchange game N, P, U as introduced in section 3, there exists a pair-wise-stable strategy profile p * .
Proof. Arbitrarily pick a network exchanges game N, P, U as introduced in sec-tion 3 and consider the following system of inequalities:
In [7] , we showed the existence of feasible solutions to the above system of inequalities when RQ • For each unmatched i ∈ N , arbitrarily pick a neighbor j ∈ N br(i) and set p * i = (j, 0, 0).
We now show that p * is pair-wise stable. Assume p * is not pair-wise stable.
First we note that for all i ∈ N , the strategy p * i = (j, m i , m j ) is such that V ij (m i , m j ) ≥ 0. Then by lemma 1 there exits an exchange opportunity (i, j) ∈ E and a rationally feasible pareto-efficient payoff vector (v i , v j ) ∈ RQ i,j ([0, 1]) such that v i ≥ u i (p * ) and v j ≥ u j (p * ) with at least one strict inequality. Pick any such exchange opportunity (i, j). Clearly, (i, j) / ∈ EN because by definition (u i (p * ), u j (p * )) is a pareto-efficient payoff vector for the exchange opportunity (i, j). Therefore u j (p * ) ≥ RQ i,j j (λ 1 ) > RQ i,j j (λ 2 ) = v j which contradicts the assumption that v j ≥ u j (p * ). Since (i, j) was arbitrarily picked, therefore there does not exist an exchange opportunity (i, j) ∈ E and a rationally feasible pareto-efficient payoff vector (v i , v j ) ∈ RQ i,j ([0, 1]) such that v i ≥ u i (p * ) and v j ≥ u j (p * ) with at least one strict inequality. Therefore by lemma 1, p * is pair-wise stable.
Thus we have proved the existence of a pair-wise stable strategy profile in every network exchange game as introduced in section 3. The pair-wise stable strategy profile induces a pair-wise stable exchange network and a pair-wise stable payoff profile and hence, every network exchange game as introduced in section 3 has a pair-wise stable stable exchange network and a pair-wise stable payoff profile.
Conclusion
In this paper we show that when the individuals in a bipartite network exclusively choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable.
